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direction of indirect network effects and show that increasing the number of potential matches has a
positive effect due to larger choice, but also a negative effect due to competition between agents on the
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outside options. For agents with high outside options, the choice effect is stronger than the competition
effect, leading them to prefer an unrestricted-choice platform. The opposite is the case for agents with
low outside options, who then have higher willingness to pay for a platform restricting choice, as it also
restricts the choice set of their potential matches. Moreover, since only agents with low outside options
self-select into the restricted choice platform, the competition effect is mitigated further. This allows
multiple platforms offering different number of choices to coexist without the market tipping.
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Abstract
We show that a two-sided platform can successfully compete using strategy that includes limiting the choice of potential matches it offers to its customers, while charging higher prices than
platforms with unrestricted choice. Starting from micro-foundations, we derive the strength
and direction of network effect, and show that increasing the number of potential matches not
only has a positive effect due to larger choice, but also a negative effect due to competition
between agents on the same side. Agents with heterogeneous outside options resolve the tradeoff between the two effects differently. For agents with a lower outside option, the competitive
effect is stronger than the choice effect. Hence, these agents have higher willingness to pay for
a platform restricting choice, as it also restricts the choice set of their potential matches. Moreover, the type of agents who self select into the restricted-choice platform also plays a role in
mitigating the competition effect. Agents with a higher outside option prefer a platform offering
unrestricted choice. Therefore, the two platforms may coexist without the market tipping. Our
model may help explain why platforms with different business models coexist in markets using
the stylized model of online dating.
Keywords: matching platform; indirect network effects; limits to network effects
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Introduction

In markets with network externalities consumer’s utility is partly determined by how many other
customers use the product (Ambrus and Argenziano, 2009). Seminal works analyzing network
effects studied how addition of one more customer in a market influences another customer’s utility, concluding that increasing the number of other consumers in a network (i.e., the number of
complements offered to a consumer) may yield positive network effects (e.g., Katz and Shapiro,
1985, 1994). Positive network externalities, in turn, will increase the attractiveness of the product,
allowing firms to extract higher rents. If this holds, managers should provide customers with a
large set of complements, as long as this can be achieved without sacrificing their quality.
Given this seemingly intuitive advice, it is surprising that we observe firms that operate by
actively reducing the number of complements available to customers. These firms essentially limit
the extent to which their customers benefit from indirect network effects. One may suspect that
firms restricting choice should be at a competitive disadvantage. However, not only do these firms
survive against competitors offering more complements, but they can also succeed at charging
higher prices.
Consider, for example, (heterosexual) online dating industry, where customers draw value from
larger numbers of opposite gender candidates and the companies spend substantial resources to
attract people to their sites. Yet, firms in this market compete with very different business models.
Most sites, such as Match.com, capitalize on their size by providing its members with unlimited
access to thousands of other members in their database. Other sites, such as eHarmony.com, also
pursue active member growth, but limit the number of new candidates that any member can see to
seven, thereby actively reducing choice. At the same time, eHarmony charges a higher price than
Match.1 It is puzzling that despite access to fewer candidates, eHarmony’s customers are willing
to pay a premium of over 25%.2
Our explanation for this phenomenon is based on the interplay of two opposite effects that arise
when the number of candidates an agent meets on the platform increases.3 These opposing forces
are especially prevalent in environments where the two sides are treated in a symmetric way, i.e.,
when the platform offers smaller or larger number of candidates to both sides of the market. On
1

For details on eHarmony and Match see Piskorski et al. (2009).
eHarmony claims to have a superior algorithm for matching people. Some point to this algorithm as the reason
for customers’ higher willingness to pay and hence for the price premium. Our model shows that even without a
superior algorithm, eHarmony provides value to customers solely by limiting the choice.
3
As Baldwin and Woodard (2009) point out, term ‘platform’ is used in three distinct but related fields: product
development, technology strategy, and industrial economics. We use it in the industrial economics sense to refer to
a meeting place of consumers facilitated by a seller. For examples of other platforms in the same category, we refer
the reader to Hagiu (2014).
2
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one hand, an agent is more likely to find an attractive match if the platform offers more candidates.
This is because she has access to a larger choice set. On the other hand, she is less likely to be
accepted by her chosen match if there are more candidates available to her. This is because the
candidates also have a larger choice set. And therefore, the probability of being inferior to another
agent in the candidate’s choice set increases as well. We call the former the choice effect and the
latter the competition effect.
Interestingly, as our model shows, the trade-off between the two effects is resolved differently for
different individuals. For agents who have high disutility of staying alone or more immediacy for
matching with a candidate, the competition effect is stronger than the choice effect. These agents
will prefer on-line dating sites such as eHarmony, where both men and women see only a limited
number of candidates. There, they can improve the probability of being accepted. Firstly, because
their candidates have less choice. As the competition effect outweighs the choice effect, agents with
low utility of staying alone gain more when the choice set of their candidates is limited than they
lose when their own choice set is limited. Moreover, the candidates on the other side attracted to
the restricted-choice platform also have lower utility of being alone. This selection effect further
increases of probability of being accepted, separately from the effect of restricting choice set of the
candidates. Thus, the agents with high disutility of staying alone prefer to join the restricted-choice
platform, even at the cost of seeing fewer candidates.
In contrast, agents who have higher value of staying alone (or less immediacy to find someone) do
not find rejection as costly, and hence prefer to join sites which offer a larger selection of candidates
such as Match. The differences in the value of staying alone, which determine the sensitivity to
the positive choice effect and the negative competition effect, can explain the coexistence of firms
competing with different business models: those that offer more choice, and others that actively
limit choice. Different offerings appeal to different types of customers. Contrary to expected, the site
that offers fewer complements can thrive in a market aside of a site that offers more complements.
Interestingly, we also show that the platform limiting choice is able to charge a higher price than
the competitor offering more choice. This is because the restricted-choice platform gains by keeping
out agents with higher value of staying alone, as keeping them out is one of the factors increasing
the probability of being accepted by a candidate, and thus increases the willingness to pay of agents
with lower value of staying alone.
We formalize our insights in three steps. First, we build a stylized model of a two-sided dating
market with men and women on the two sides, and derive properties of indirect network effects
in this environment. Following seminal papers on network effects (e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985),
we say that there is a positive network effect when the value of joining the platform increases in
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the number of agents participating in the platform on the same side.4 Our model shows that the
relative magnitudes of the two effects change as the number of candidates offered increases.5 When
a platform offers only a few candidates to its customers, there is little competition among same
side agents and the choice effect dominates. This leads to a positive network effect. As the choice
set increases, competition among same side agents increases and the competition effect eventually
overwhelms the choice effect. The network effect then becomes negative. Although virtually all
agents on a platform benefit from an increased choice set, gaining these benefits is conditional on
the occurrence of a match. And the likelihood of matching decreases as the number of complements
increases.
Second, we recognize that agents are heterogeneous in their need for immediacy of a match.
Agents who have high costs of staying alone suffer more from the competition effect since competition increases the likelihood that these agents will remain single. Conversely, agents who have
high utility from being alone are affected less by competition. Taking into account that the two
forces affect different types of agents asymmetrically, our findings show that not only there are
limits to the positive network effects, but that this limit is different for different type of agents.
In particular, for each agent, there exists a threshold beyond which his utility decreases as more
complements are offered by the platform. Moreover, this threshold is different for different types of
agents. This gives the platforms an opportunity to extract rents by actively reducing the number
of complements available.
Finally, we study how the limits to network effects influence strategies of platforms in a
monopoly and duopoly and we characterize equilibria in such markets. Specifically, we show that
a platform such as eHarmony, where both men and women see only a limited number of candidates, attracts agents who feel greater immediacy to find a match, either because they have a lower
utility from staying alone, or less patience. Less patient agents join the platform with restricted
choice because it increases their chance to find a match sooner, even at the cost of a possibly worse
match due to meeting fewer number of candidates. Therefore, they gain more from restricting the
choice set on the other side than they lose from restricting their own choice set. And since the
restricted-choice platform is attractive for less patient agents, the candidates are more likely to
accept the match sooner also due to their type. Those two reinforcing effects make the platform
even more attractive to the agents with less patience or lower utility from staying alone. Moreover,
4
This definition applies to both direct and indirect network effects. For the indirect network effect, in a two-sided
platform, the benefit arises because having more agents on the same side increases the participation of agents on the
other side. With more agents on the other side, the platform can offer a higher expected utility from a successful
match to an agent. These properties play an important role in the platform’s strategy via the choice effect and the
competition effect.
5
We focus on environments where the number of candidates offered to both sides is the same.
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these agents are willing to pay a premium to participate in a platform restricting a choice set.
Therefore the platform is active in the market and is profitable, even when it competes with a
platform that offers more candidates and does not charge a fee to participate. More patient agents
join the platform with more choice because meeting more candidates increases the expected value
from the match, even if it reduces the expected probability of a successful match. This implies that
a strategy of a platform in a competitive environment includes not only prices, but also the number
of candidates it offers access to. It also explains why platforms such as eHarmony and Match can
coexist in the market, as the mechanism we describe shows that the market does not need to tip in
favor of the platform that offers more choice. Interestingly, eHarmony advertises itself as a website
for people who are looking for a serious relationship, including marriage. This may be interpreted
as targeting people with lower utility of being alone who want to get married relatively sooner.6
One may expect that when firms restrict choice, they do so by eliminating less compatible
matches. Our explanation of the existence and popularity of restricted-choice platforms does not
assume that platforms have any ability to recognize a match potential, but assumes that the restriction happens by choosing candidates randomly. We also do not assume psychological aversion to
abundant choices. It should be noted however that our model does not preclude these possibilities:
if the platform that restricts choice also offers more compatible candidates and services, or if people
have distaste for excessive choice, it may be even more successful than our model predicts.
In our model, we assume that the platform offers the same number of candidates to agents
on both sides of the market. It is not crucial that the number is exactly the same. A crucial
assumption is the existence of same-side competition on both sides of the market. Some matching
markets do not exhibit such property, e.g., buying a copy of a videogame does not prevent other
gamers from also buying a copy of the same game. Therefore there is no competition on the side
of gamers for videogames.
We model the effect of the platform’s ability to manipulate — increase or decrease — the
number of candidates (complements) their customers have access to, which has not been previously
explored in the literature. And it is important that the increase or decrease occurs on both sides
of the market. Such co-movement in both sides’ dynamics is not a contrived element of our model,
but rather an inherent property of markets with indirect network effects.
When the positive indirect effects are present, increasing the number of agents on one side
makes the platform more attractive to the other side, resulting in an increase in the number of
6

Similarly, in the labor market, headhunters are used primarily by employers or candidates for whom the cost
of not finding an acceptable match quickly is high (Khurana, 2004). In the real estate market, it is accepted that
agents who opt for real estate brokers (as opposed to FSBO) are those who assign more value to quickly finalizing
the transaction (Hendel et al., 2009). In all these markets, people are willing to pay a premium for immediacy, which
makes platforms that restrict choice more costly, as predicted by our model.
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agents on the other side, which benefits the agents on side one. Thus, agents indirectly benefit
from increasing the number of agents on same side, because it induces the co-movement on the
other side. Network effect by its nature is a mutual reinforcement effect where both sides either
grow or both decline. Typically, successful platforms have lots of agents on both sides. Unsuccessful
ones have little to offer on both sides.
The remainder of the paper is structured in the following way: Section 2 provides a review
of the related literature. Section 3 sets up the model and then analyzes the strength of and the
limit to network effects, and how they depend on an agent’s type. We show that as the number of
candidates on both sides increases, positive network effects disappear for agents with lower utility of
being alone. Section 4 investigates a market with a matching platform, and shows that there always
exists an equilibrium where agents pay to participate in a platform that offers fewer candidates than
the outside market, which is accessible for free. Section 4.1 focuses on the analysis of a monopolist
platform whereas Section 4.2 shows that the findings are also true when two strategic platforms
compete. Section 5 discusses the importance of key assumptions for the results and Section 6
concludes.

2

Related Literature

Our paper focuses on network competition and network effects. Seminal works in this literature
suggest that when platforms compete with each other, the platform offering the largest choice
should take over the market (e.g., Katz and Shapiro, 1985). Moreover, previous work on network
effects often assumed that the presence of other agents on the platform exogenously increases
utility, usually in a linear form (e.g., Rochet and Tirole, 2003). As a consequence, every additional
agent on the platform increases overall payoff to others, no matter how many other agents are
already available. We depart from such assumptions and derive the network effects from the microfoundations in the defined matching environment. In this environment, we identify not only the
positive (opposite-side) choice effect, but also a negative (same-side) competitive effect; and we
study how the trade-off between the two effects allows for co-existence of platforms with different
business models.
More recently, a few papers examined the trade-off between the positive opposite-side effect
and negative same-side effect to show how multiple firms can coexist in environments with network
effects. These papers analyze different environments from ours, and so their results are determined
by different forces. For example, Ellison and Fudenberg (2003) and Ellison et al. (2004) study
competition between two auction sites. Similarly to our paper, they assume that agents are het6

erogeneous. In contrast, however, their agents choose auction sites (platforms) before they know
their type, while ours are aware of their type prior to choosing their platform. Furthermore, they
assume that the clearing price on every platform is determined by the ratio of buyers to sellers.
Then, they show that multiple auction sites can coexist as long as they have the same buyer-toseller ratio, and therefore no arbitrage opportunity, i.e., when they are undifferentiated. Although
this ratio condition may be appropriate for auctions, it cannot be assumed to be the only crucial
factor in other environments. Thus, our model builds micro-foundations of the trade-off between
choice and competition to show that the number of candidates offered by a platform explains why
multiple platforms can coexist in matching environments. Several other economists have identified
the complications that arise from increasing the number of options in a network. Calvó-Armengol
and Zenou (2005) for example, suggested in the context of a labor market that being connected to
too many agents in a random matching network can result in frictions and reduce the probability
of a match in a job network. That study, however, does not identify the limits of positive network
effects for each agent but arbitrarily assumes the same limit for all.
Our model is perhaps closest to Damiano and Li (2007), who examine why a revenue-maximizing
monopolist would establish many platforms with different entry prices to separate and match different types of agents. Their model assumes that agents are heterogeneous in productivity and
have different reservation utilities. They find that platforms can charge different prices to separate
high productivity agents and allow them to match with each other. This is similar to our result
whereby price separates agents with low utility of being unmatched from others. However, they
assume that on every platform established by the monopolist, agents have only one candidate to
consider. We relax this assumption to show that platforms that reduce the number of candidates
offered are valuable to agents with low utility of staying alone. In the discussion section we examine
the relationship between our paper and Damiano and Li (2007) in more detail.
An emerging literature in strategy explores competitive interaction between organizations with
different business models. Casadesus-Masanell and Ghemawat (2006) and Economides and Katsamakas (2006), for example, study duopoly models in which a profit-maximizing competitor interacts with an open-source competitor. Casadesus-Masanell and Hervas-Drane (2010) study competitive interaction between a high-quality incumbent that faces a low-quality ad-sponsored competitor.
Finally, Casadesus-Masanell and Zhu (2010) analyze competitive interactions between a free peerto-peer file-sharing network and a profit-maximizing firm that sells the same content at positive
price, and distributes digital files through an efficient client-server architecture. In our paper, firms
could be seen as competing with different business models, as one matching platform deliberately
limits the choice (to all its customers) while competing against one that offers unlimited choice
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within its database. We study forces in the market that allow such competition to be successful.
Our study also relates to the literature on ‘co-opetition’ (e.g., Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996;
MacDonald and Ryall, 2004). In their widely-cited book, Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) argue
that seemingly competing product offerings may in fact act like complements and yield positive
network effects. In many ways, the two forces we describe in our study, namely the ‘competition’
and ‘choice’ effects point out to the complementary and substitutionary characteristics of candidates
on a platform. Each candidate simultaneously acts as a complement for agents on the opposite side
and a substitute for agents on the same side of the market, resonating with the arguments made
by Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1996) and MacDonald and Ryall (2004). By deriving network
effects in our model from micro-foundations, we show how the interplay between the competitive
and cooperative forces affects the properties of the network effect. Moreover, we study how those
forces affect successful strategies of competing firms.
We show why some agents may prefer an environment with less choice. The reasons why rational
agents would make such decisions might be of relevance to the branch of behavioral economics and
psychology dealing with the negative outcomes of increasing choice. The studies in this area suggest
that providing larger number of choices might eventually decrease the satisfaction and happiness
levels of consumers, suggesting behavioral mechanisms such as decision fatigue, choice overload, and
cognitive costs (e.g., Iyengar et al., 2006; Schwartz and Ward, 2004). Our study shows that even
in the absence of behavioral considerations, there is an economic explanation for why consumers
may not always be happier and more satisfied in environments offering larger number of choices.

3

Matching Environment

We use a stylized example of a two-sided heterosexual dating market for stability of reference, and
call the two sides ‘men’ (denoted by letter m) and ‘women’ (denoted by letter w). On each side
of the market, there is a continuum of agents of measure 1. Each agent can match to at most
one agent on the other side. If they do not match, we call their outside option ‘staying alone.’
Agents are heterogeneous with respect to how much utility they receive from being alone, denoted
by variable a with c.d.f. G(a) on the interval [0, 1]. The value a is private information for each
agent.
There are two stages in the ‘matching’ game. In the first stage, every agent (on either side
of the market) meets some fixed number of N agents from the other side of the market. The
number of candidates, N , is the comparative statics parameter in this model: we investigate how
an increase in this parameter influences the expected payoff of agents. Note that the platform
8

offers the same number of candidates to agents on both sides of the market.7 In the second stage,
all agents simultaneously make at most one offer. The one-offer assumption made throughout the
paper simplifies the analysis and the intuition behind the results.8 A match between man m and
woman w happens if m made his offer to w and w has made her offer to m (i.e., the offer has been
“reciprocated” or “accepted”).
Let Λm (w) represent how much the man m likes being with the woman w, and Λw (m) represent
how much the woman w likes being with the man m. We assume that both the woman’s and the
man’s liking functions are drawn from some generalized distribution with the c.d.f. G(Λ) on the
interval [0, 1].9 When a man m meets a woman w,10 he learns Λm (w) ∈ [0, 1], i.e., how much he
will like being in a relationship with her. Similarly every woman w learns Λw (m) ∈ [0, 1] about
every man m she meets.
For a man mi with ami to make an offer to a woman wi , two conditions must be satisfied.
First, he must like woman wi more than staying alone (Λmi (wi ) > ami ). Second, he must like wi
more than the other N − 1 women he meets (Λmi (wi ) > Λmi (wj ), ∀j = 1, 2, ....N, j 6= i). For a
successful match, the same must hold for the woman wi ; she must like mi more than she likes being
alone (Λwi (mi ) > awi ), and more than the other N − 1 men she meets (Λwi (mi ) > Λwi (mj ), ∀j =
1, 2, ....N, j 6= i). When all of these conditions are satisfied, offers of mi and wi are reciprocated
and a successful match takes place. If their offers are reciprocated, agents receive their respective
payoffs of Λmi (wi ) and Λwi (mi ). If an offer was not reciprocated (i.e., it is “rejected”) the agent
who made the offer remains unmatched and receives his or her respective utility of a. The game
ends with these payoffs.
An important assumption in our framework is the independence of Λ from other values of Λ and
a. This implies that the function Λ is subjective in our model: the utility of w from being matched
to m, Λw (m), is intrinsic to w and is privately known by her and does not depend on am . In other
words, our model assumes that agents’ dating preferences are ‘horizontally’ rather than ‘vertically’
differentiated. This assumption has three consequences. First, how much two agents like each
other is not correlated. This implies that the extent to which a man likes a particular woman is
7
We consider markets where the two sides are treated symmetrically. Platforms literature has shown the potential
of asymmetric treatment of the two-sides (e.g., Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005). However, in many markets firms are
restricted to treat both sides symmetrically, for legal or technical reasons.
8
The assumption that limits agents to only one offer is meant to reflect the fact that people are able to pursue only
limited number of possible relationships. This restriction applies also to other matching markets. In labor market,
for example, although the employers screen dozens of applicants, they may have capacity for a much smaller number
of interviews. Because this is a potentially restrictive assumption, Appendix A.1 considers tentative offer-making
procedures while searching for a potential match and shows that the results hold also under more realistic procedures.
9
Where there is no risk of confusion, the notation is simplified by dropping superscripts. For example, Λm (w)
may be simplified to Λ.
10
If m meets w, then it must be that w meets m.
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independent of how much she likes him. Second, how much a man (woman) likes a woman (man)
is independent of how much the other men (women) like her (him). Finally, an agent can like two
different agents at different rates. That is, how much m likes w1 is also independent of how much
he likes another woman w2 .
The independence assumption differentiates our model from many matching models. Existing
literature mostly focuses on agents’ attributes that are similarly desired by all potential partners. Such attributes can be characterized as measures of objective “quality” (e.g., Becker, 1973;
McAfee, 2002; Damiano and Li, 2007, 2008). We want to study markets where preferences are more
subjective—how much an agent likes a potential romantic partner is different from other agent’s
liking. In the main model, we assume full subjectivity. This can be justified when considering
candidates within a certain category (e.g., the same education, status, sense of humor). For a
more generalized approach, it is more appropriate to allow for partial correlation between agents’
preferences.11
Lemma 1 identifies important characteristics of the described matching market.
Lemma 1 In a market with N candidates:
(i) For every agent the probability of being rejected by a candidate on the other side of the market
is
P r(rej|N ) =
That is, the probability of being accepted is

N
.
N +1

1
N +1 .

(ii) An agent a matches successfully with probability

(1 − P r(rej|N )) 1 − GN (a) .

(iii) For an agent a the expected value of a match, conditional on being accepted, is
Z
N

1

a

GN −1 (Λ)g(Λ)ΛdΛ.

(iv) The total expected payoff for agent a is
Z

1

EU (a|N ) = 1 − (1 − P r(rej|N )) 1 − G (a) a + (1 − P r(rej|N )) · N
GN −1 (Λ)g(Λ)ΛdΛ
|
{z
}
|
{z
}
a
{z
}
prob. of acceptance |
prob. of not matching


N



exp. payoff if accepted

11

In Section A.2, we use simulation to explore a matching environment where Λ’s are correlated with a’s. The
results from the simulation show the qualitative insights from the main model hold for less-than-perfect correlation.
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Proof: See Appendix, page 32.

When a man makes an offer to a woman, he does not know her a or how much she likes him
versus the other men she has met. A priori, she is equally likely to make an offer to any of the
men, or not make an offer at all. Therefore, the probability that the offer is reciprocated by the
woman is

1
N +1 .

This is equivalent to the probability of being rejected

N
N +1 .

The probability of

being rejected increases with N , because the agent’s candidates also have a larger choice set. This
result is captured in part (i) of Lemma 1.
Whether an agent matches successfully depends on two factors: whether he wants to make an
offer and whether the offer is reciprocated. Whether the agent wants to make an offer depends on
his a. From part (i) of Lemma 1, the agent’s offer is reciprocated with probability

1
N +1 .

Because

the expected probability of rejection is the same for all candidates, the optimal strategy is to make
an offer to the best candidate, if that candidate is above the agent’s a. With probability GN (a), all
N candidates are liked less than the outside option of the agent, a. With the remaining probability
1 − GN (a), the Λ the best candidate yields is above a. Combining the probability of making an
offer and the probability that the offer is reciprocated, the probability of successfully matching is
captured in part (ii) of Lemma 1.
If the offer is reciprocated, it means that the agent has matched with the highest Λ among the
N candidates and this highest Λ was above his utility from being alone, a. The expected value
of a match is formalized in part (iii) of Lemma 1 which is equivalent to the expected value of the
maximal Λ, given that it is above a.
Part (iv) of Lemma 1 puts together all the previous three parts and formalizes the expected
payoff of an agent a in a market with N candidates. We say that positive network effects are present
if increasing the size of accessible network, N , increases agent’s expected payoff. In contrast, when
increasing the size of accessible network decreases an agent’s expected payoff, we consider the
network effects to be negative.
A number of properties follow directly from Lemma 1. Two of them, choice effect and competition effect, characterized in Corollaries 1 and 2, play especially important roles in our analysis.

Corollary 1 (Choice Effect) For any a < 1, expected value of a match, conditional on successfully matching, is nondecreasing with the number of candidates (N ):
 R

1
∂ N a GN −1 (Λ)g(Λ)ΛdΛ
≥ 0.
∂N
11

Proof: See Appendix, page 34.
Corollary 1 states that the expected value from a successful match is non-decreasing when an
agent meets more candidates. As N increases, conditionally on a successful match, the agent can
expect to match with a woman of his higher liking. We refer to this effect as the choice effect.
This would suggest that an agent can achieve higher expected utility when dating in a market
with more candidates, and in many environments, this effect is the driver of the positive network
effects. However, we also need to take into account the competition effect stated in Corollary 2. The
probability that an agent a’s offer will be accepted is decreasing with N . With more candidates, each
woman has more men to choose from, i.e., every man has more competition. Notice that increasing
your own choice set also increases the choice set of your candidates. This in turn decreases the
probability that a woman w wants to match with man m, when m wants to match with w.
Corollary 2 (Competition Effect) For every agent a < 1, the probability of being rejected is
increasing in N .
Proof: Follows directly from part (i) of Lemma 1.
So, does the market offering a larger number of candidates (a larger “dating network”) make the
agents better off? Corollaries 1 and 2 document effects going in opposite directions: The expected
pay-off of an agent from joining the platform depends on both the choice and the competition
effect. If the expected payoff for an agent increases as N increases, there is a positive indirect
network effect: having more agents on the same side increases the agent’s utility, because it is tied
to increasing the number of candidates on the other side of the market. This is because expanding
your own choice set at the same time also expands the choice set on the other side, and lowers the
probability of a match. Proposition 1 shows that there are positive network effects, but they reach
their limit, and then turn negative, as N increases. The limit to network effects emerges because
some agents gain more from decreasing choice set of the candidates they meet than they lose by
reducing their own choice set.
Interestingly, since the choice and the competition effects affect different agent types asymmetrically, the limit to the network effect is different for different types. The optimal size of the choice
set is larger for agents with higher utility of staying alone.
Proposition 1 (Limits to Positive Network Effects)
(i) For every a, there exists N̄ (a) such that EU (a|N + 1) − EU (a|N ) is positive for N < N̄ (a), and
negative for N ≥ N̄ (a).
(ii) N̄ (a) is non-decreasing in a.
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Proof: See Appendix, page 35.
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Figure 1: Limit to the network effect as a function of a.
Proposition 1 coins the first main insight of this paper: for every agent, there exists a limit
beyond which there are no positive network effects. The choice effect, stated in Corollary 1, declines
in strength as N increases. Each additional candidate increases the expected value of a successful
match by a smaller amount than the previous one. At the same time, the competition effect, stated
in Corollary 2, increases in N . The agent is less likely to be accepted as his or her candidates
also have a larger set to choose from. With these two opposing forces, the positive network effect
experienced by agent a declines in strength as N increases, until it reaches its limit at N̄ (a). Above
that level, an increase of N decreases agent’s expected payoff: above N̄ (a) the network effect is
negative. The agent gains less by having more candidates than he loses when his candidates have
more choice.
Additionally, part (ii) of Proposition 1 states that for agents with higher a’s, N̄ (a) is larger,
as illustrated in Figure 1. For agents with low a it is likely that already few candidates provide
matching value above a. Meeting more candidates does not increase this probability enough to offset
the increased probability of having the offer rejected. However, for agents with high a, the increase
in the probability that at least one candidate is better than a offsets the increased probability of
having an offer rejected, as the agent meets an additional candidate. That is, agents with low a
gain less by having more choice, and lose more by their candidates having more choice. While
agents with high a gain more from larger choice set than they lose by their candidates having a
larger choice set. If the number of candidates N is large enough, agents with low a prefer that
13

N was lower, while agents with high a prefer that N was even higher. That is, agents with low
a feel that they are in a market with “too many candidates.” This property is driven mainly by
the assumption that agents can court a limited number of candidates.12 The larger the pool, the
smaller the probability that the agent is within the limited number of courted candidates.
Our analysis so far implies that network effects (both the strength and direction) depend not
only on the agent’s type, a, but also on how much competition the network supports, N . In
contrast, most of the literature on platform competition assumes that the number of agents on the
other side of the market enter the payoff function linearly, i.e., every agent on the other side of the
network contributes the same amount to the expected payoff (e.g., Rochet and Tirole, 2003). In
those papers, if the competitive effect is included, every additional agent on the same side of the
market also affects the payoff linearly. The positive network effect is present when the choice effect
outweighs the competition effect. But since the effects are assumed to be constant, the positive
network effect never weakens or disappears, and it is always better for agents when the size of
accessible network increases (i.e., there is more choice and more competition). In such a set-up
it is always profit maximizing for a platform to offer access to all the agents who have joined.13
Moreover, it would not be possible for a platform that restricts choice to attract agents away from
a market with more choice and more competition. As we have shown in this section, departing
from linearity assumption, and deriving network effects from micro-foundations in the particular
environment lets us identify a more nuanced interplay of choice and competition effects that gives
rise to network effects that differ in strength and direction.
In the next section, we show that given the described properties of the matching market and
limits to network effects, a platform can successfully operate in a market by offering less choice
to all its customers compared to the market outside of the platform, which offers more choice to
everyone.

4

Matching Platforms
The previous section considered the effect of the market offering smaller or larger number of

candidates on agents’ payoffs in an environment where all agents were in the same market. In this
section we analyze an environment where agents can choose between multiple sub-markets that
offer different number of candidates. As we expect by the forces identified in the previous section,
different types of agents prefer to join sub-markets with different number of candidates. This self12

Our main model assumes that an agent can court only one candidate. In Section A.1, we show that the results
hold when every agent can court an arbitrary but fixed number of candidates.
13
Notice that in our environment the platform could have many more agents joining but offer access to N candidates.
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selection of types has a further effect on performance of each sub-market, as agents of different
types are on average more or less likely to reject a candidate.

4.1

Matchmaking Platform and Non-strategic Outside Market

The trade-off outlined in the previous section demonstrates that some agents prefer a market
offering fewer candidates, as it also reduces competition. We have shown that the trade-off varies
with the type of agent, a. In this section, we explore strategic opportunities that those properties
offer to a matching platform. In particular, we focus on the fact that a platform may earn positive
profits when providing fewer candidates than the outside market to its customers, as long as it
offers fewer candidates to agents on both sides.
Let the outside market be a decentralized, non-strategic market, where each agent meets Ω
candidates and pays no fee. There is also a matching platform offering N < Ω candidates, and
charging a positive participation fee f . Agents decide whether to participate in the platform or
stay in the outside market.
The strategy of providing fewer candidates restricts the choice, but also reduces the competition,
which results in a lower rejection probability. A restricted-choice platform will attract those agents
who lose relatively little when reducing their own choice, but gain a lot from reducing the choice of
their candidates. Hence, by the earlier analysis, we know that only agents with sufficiently low a
prefer to participate in the platform at a given positive fee. Agents with higher a prefer to stay in
the outside market. In other words, agents for whom the competition effect is large compared to the
choice effect are willing to pay a positive fee to participate in such a platform. Therefore, candidates
that can be met in the restricted-choice platform have a’s drawn from a truncated distribution.
The resulting self-selection further influences the rejection probabilities in the platform and in the
outside market.
To characterize equilibria in such a market, first notice that a situation in which all agents stay in
the outside market is always an equilibrium. However, there also always exist equilibria where some
agents participate in the platform. We focus our investigation on the equilibria where the platform
is active (i.e., some agents participate in the platform). Especially, we show that for N < Ω, there
always exists an equilibrium where some agents pay a positive price to participate in the platform.
To characterize this equilibrium, we start by considering how an agent’s willingness to pay for
joining the platform changes with his or her type, a. An agent is willing to pay up to the additional
utility that the platform provides above the outside market, i.e., W T P (a) = EU (a|N ) − EU (a|Ω).
When an agent makes his individual decision about whether to join the platform, he takes others’
actions as given, and thus platform’s fee and rejection probabilities are constant from the point
15

of view of the agent. (In an equilibrium, the rejection probabilities are determined by all agents’
participation decisions.) Whereas the rejection probabilities and the fee are the same for all agents,
the expected payoff depends on a.
Lemma 2 For any given P r(rej|N ) and P r(rej|Ω) > P r(rej|N ) and for any Ω and N < Ω, the
willingness to pay W T P (a) = EU (a|N, P r(rej|N ))−EU (a|Ω, P r(rej|Ω)) is positive and decreasing
for a ∈ [0, ã), where 0 < ã ≤ 1. For a ∈ (ã, 1], W T P (a) is negative.
Proof. See Appendix, page 37.
An agent prefers to join the platform only if the benefit of joining outweighs the fee, i.e.,
W T P (a) > f . Therefore, it follows from Lemma 2 that for any P r(rej|N ) and P r(rej|Ω) >
P r(rej|N ) and some positive fee f ,14 there exists b
a ∈ (0, 1) such that agents with a ∈ [0, b
a) strictly
prefer to join the platform at f , agents with a ∈ (b
a, 1] prefer to stay outside, and agents b
a are
indifferent. The properties characterized by Lemma 2 guarantee also that such b
a is unique.
Under this circumstance, the probability of rejection for an agent is affected by the fact that a
of candidates is not drawn from the whole distribution, but from a subinterval [a, a] ⊂ [0, 1]. We
can no longer rely on the rejection probability characterized in Lemma 1. Instead, when taking
into account self-selection, the probability of rejection is
P r (rej|N, a ∈ [a, a]) = 1 −

1
1
GN +1 (a) − GN +1 (a)
+
·
.
N
N (N + 1)
G(a) − G(a)

Notice that P r(rej|N, a ∈ [0, b
a)) < P r(rej|Ω, a ∈ (b
a, 1]) for any Ω, N < Ω and b
a. This comes
from two separate forces working in the same direction: (i) because N < Ω, and (ii) because lower
a’s join the platform. With P r(rej|N ) < P r(rej|Ω), the premise of Lemma 2 is satisfied. It is
also worth noting that when the rejection probability is higher in the platform than in the outside
market, i.e., P r(rej|N ) > P r(rej|Ω), no agent joins the platform at any positive f .15 Therefore,
there does not exist an equilibrium with an active platform and P r(rej|N ) > P r(rej|Ω).
The platform sets its fee, f , with the objective of maximizing its profit.16 In equilibrium it must
be that EU (b
a|N, P r(rej|N, a ∈ [0, b
a))) − EU (b
a|Ω, P r(rej|Ω, a ∈ (b
a, 1])) = f . This condition characterizes the threshold b
a on which the market settles for any f chosen by the platform. Moreover,
b
a uniquely characterizes the rejection probabilities, for given N and Ω. Therefore, we can solve the
problem as if the platform was choosing b
a directly instead of choosing f .
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As long as the fee is not prohibitively high, i.e., f < EU (a = 0|N, P r(rej|N )) − EU (a = 0|Ω, P r(rej|Ω)).
This can be shown by the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 2. See Corollary B.1 in Appendix, page 38.
16
We assume that all the costs for the platform are fixed costs, and the marginal cost is 0. Thus, the profit
maximization is equivalent to revenue maximization.
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Platform’s profit is G(b
a) · f (b
a). Unsurprisingly, for higher fees fewer agents find it worthwhile
to participate in the platform, and more agents join at lower fee. Nobody joins (i.e., b
a = 0) when
f rises to 1; and to capture the whole market, the platform needs to set f = 0.17 However, for
intermediate fees (i.e., b
a ∈ (0, 1)) the profit is positive. Therefore, for any Ω and N < Ω, there
exists an equilibrium with an active platform.

Proposition 2 Suppose that in the outside market agents meet Ω candidates, and that there is a
platform offering N < Ω candidates. For any Ω and N < Ω, there exists an equilibrium where
the platform maximizes its profit by charging a positive fee f . In this equilibrium there exists a
threshold a∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that agents with a ∈ [0, a∗ ) join the platform, agents with a ∈ (a∗ , 1] stay
in the outside market, and agents with a = a∗ are indifferent.
Proof. See Appendix, page 38.
Proposition 2 establishes that there is a profitable strategy of limiting the number of candidates.
When the platform provides fewer candidates than the outside market, a non-empty interval of
agents joins the platform at a positive fee. Interestingly, the platform does not find it profitable
to serve the whole market. The rejection probability in the platform is lower than the rejection
probability in the outside market for two reasons. First, agents face less competition in the platform,
due to N < Ω. Second, agents in the platform are more likely to make and accept an offer, since
they have lower utility of being alone. Notice that the first effect comes from the fact that the
platform restricts not only the agent’s own choice set, but also the choice sets of their candidates.
However, the second effect comes directly from the fact that the agent’s choice set is restricted (not
because the candidate’s choice set is restricted). This is because smaller choice set on the agent’s
own side attracts candidates with lower a on the other side. And it affects the rejection probability
separately from the first effect. Observe that the second effect was not present in the analysis of
the previous section, as it appears only when agents can choose which platform to join.
The outside market offers more candidates. Larger number of candidates increases the expected
value of a match if matching is successful, while decreasing the probability of matching, as the
candidates also have more choice. And the probability of rejection in the outside market also
increases due to selection effect: outside market attracts agents with higher a, who are more likely
to reject all candidates. Nonetheless, for agents with sufficiently high utility of being alone, the
positive choice effect outweighs even this exacerbated negative competition effect. Those agents
prefer the outside market, which offers more choice and more competition. Agents with lower utility
17

See Corollary B.2 in Appendix, page 38.
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of being alone, however, prefer to join the platform, where they have less competition, but also less
choice.

4.2

Competing Platforms

The previous section analyzed the optimal strategy of a matching platform facing a non-strategic
outside market. In this section we investigate equilibrium in a market where there are two platforms
setting their access fees to maximize their profits. We show that a platform offering fewer candidates can profitably coexist in the market with a platform offering a larger number of candidates.
Moreover, the platform with fewer candidates charges a higher price.
Suppose that one platform offers M1 candidates to all its customers, and the other offers M2 >
M1 . We use Mi to denote both the platform and the number of candidates it offers. Each platform
i = 1, 2 charges fi to maximize its profit. We maintain the assumption of single-homing. An agent
who does not join either of the platforms remains unmatched.18
Each agent decides which platform to join, if any, given the decisions of everyone else. That is,
from the point of view of an individual agent the fees charged by the platforms, and the respective
rejection probabilities are constant. (In equilibrium, however, they are determined by participation
decisions of all agents.)
Lemma 3 For any given P r(rej|M2 ), EU (a|M2 , P r(rej|M2 )) − a is positive and decreasing in a.
Moreover, for a = 1, EU (a|M2 , P r(rej|M2 )) − a = 0.
Proof. See Appendix, page 39.
For a given probability of rejection P r(rej|M2 ), consider a positive fee f2 .19 By Lemma 3 there
exists â2 ∈ (0, 1) such that agent â2 is indifferent between joining platform M2 at f2 and staying
unmatched, i.e., EU (â2 |M2 , P r(rej|M2 )) − f2 = â2 . All agents a > â2 strictly prefer staying
unmatched to joining M2 , while agents a < â2 strictly prefer joining M2 to staying unmatched.
Applying Lemma 2 to M1 < M2 and any P r(rej|M1 ) and P r(rej|M2 ) such that P r(rej|M1 ) <
P r(rej|M2 ) yields Corollary 3.
Corollary 3 For any given P r(rej|M1 ) and P r(rej|M2 ) such that P r(rej|M1 ) < P r(rej|M2 ),
EU (a|M1 , P r(rej|M1 )) − EU (a|M2 , P r(rej|M2 )) is positive and decreasing for a ∈ [0, ā), where
0 < ā ≤ 1. Moreover, EU (ā|M1 , P r(rej|M1 )) − EU (ā|M2 , P r(rej|M2 )) = 0
18

We make this assumption because the point of this section is to show the interaction between the two platforms,
and the assumption allows for mathematical simplicity of the proofs.
19
As long as the fee is not prohibitively high, i.e. we only consider f2 < EU (a = 0|M2 , P r(rej|M2 )).
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Consider now any f1 > f2 .20 By Corollary 3 there exists â1 ∈ (0, 1) such that agent â1 is
indifferent between joining platform M1 at f1 and joining M2 at f2 , i.e., EU (â1 |M1 , P r(rej, M1 )) −
f1 = EU (â1 |M2 , P r(rej, M2 )) − f2 . All agents a > â1 strictly prefer M2 to M1 , and all agents
a < â2 strictly prefer M1 to M2 .
If â1 > â2 , then no agent chooses to join platform M2 . This is because agents with a < â2 prefer
M1 to M2 or staying unmatched; agents with a > â1 prefer staying unmatched rather than to join
M2 or M1 ; and for agents with â2 < a < â1 both staying unmatched and joining platform M1 are
more attractive than M2 .
When â1 < â2 , then agents with a < â1 choose M1 (they prefer M2 to staying unmatched, but
prefer M1 to M2 ); agents with a ∈ (â1 , â2 ) choose M2 (they prefer it both to M1 and to staying
unmatched); and agents with a > â2 choose staying unmatched to either of the platforms. Notice
also, that in such a case the resulting rejection probabilities are indeed P r(rej|M1 , a ∈ [0, â1 )) <
P r(rej|M2 , a ∈ (â1 , â2 )).
Given the decisions of the agents, platforms decide on their strategies, i.e., setting the fees.
Notice, however, that f1 and f2 uniquely characterize â1 (f1 , f2 ) and â2 (f1 , f2 ); moreover, â1 and
â2 uniquely characterize P r(rej|M1 , a ∈ [0, â1 )) and P r(rej|M1 , a ∈ (â1 , â2 )). Therefore, we can
think of the platforms as choosing â∗i given â∗j , instead of fi given fj .
Platforms’ profits are a product of their fees and the measure of agents who join them. First,
notice that platform M1 would never set â1 = 1, as it would require f1 = 0, and would result in 0
profits, while positive profits for other â1 ’s are available. Similarly, M1 never sets â1 = 0, as it also
results in 0 profits. However, for â1 ∈ (0, 1), M1 ’s profits are positive.
Similarly, platform M2 would never set â2 ≤ â1 , as it would bring it 0 profit. Also, setting
â2 = 1 would require f2 = 0, and would result in 0 profits. But â2 ∈ (â1 , 1) yields a positive profit
for M2 . Thus, in an equilibrium 0 < â1 < â2 < 1. In the proof of Proposition 3 we show that such
an equilibrium exists.21
Proposition 3 Suppose that in the market there are two matching platforms which offer M1 and
M2 > M1 candidates, respectively. For any M1 and M2 > M1 there exists an equilibrium where
platforms charge positive fees f1 and f2 < f1 , respectively, and there are two thresholds â1 and â2
such that 0 < â1 < â2 < 1, and agents with a ∈ [0, â1 ) participate in platform M1 , agents with
a ∈ (â1 , â2 ) participate in platform M2 , agents with a ∈ (â2 , 1] remain unmatched. Agents with
a = â1 are indifferent between M1 and M2 , and agents with a = â2 are indifferent between platform
M2 and remaining unmatched.
20
21

As long as the fee is not prohibitively high, i.e. f1 < EU (a = 0|M1 , P r(rej|M1 ))−EU (a = 0|M2 , P r(rej|M2 ))+f2 .
We do not exclude existence of other equilibria.
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Proof. See Appendix page 40.
Proposition 3 establishes that two strategic matching platforms can profitably coexist in the
market. By the same logic as in the proposition, we can see that a larger number of such platforms—
each offering a different number of candidates—could profitably coexist in the market. As the
number of matching platforms operating in the market increases, each attracts a smaller interval of
agents, thus earning smaller profits. Positive fixed cost of operation, or entry cost, may hold more
firms from entering the market, as they would not be able to cover those costs. Without fixed cost,
and with continuum of agents, there could be an infinite number of platforms profitably operating
in the market—with platforms offering fewer candidates charging higher access fees.
These results bear some resemblance to the result in Damiano and Li (2007). They show how
different types of agents self-select into different “meeting places,” where they meet similar agents.
The tool of separation between the meeting places is the price: Only some types find it worthwhile
to pay higher price. In both their and our papers, meeting agents of similar type increases the
efficiency of matching. The model in Damiano and Li (2007) differs in many assumptions from
our model (see Section 5 for discussion). Most importantly, they do not investigate the network
effects. In every meeting place every agent meets exactly one candidate. In our result there are
two effects. One—the self-selection—is similar to described by Damiano and Li (2007), but the
other—preferences over the number of candidates the platform offers to all its customers—is not
captured by their model.

5

Discussion
This section focuses on two major assumptions of the model, and discusses the significance of

these assumptions for the results.

5.1

Heterogeneous value of being alone, a

Many papers in matching literature (e.g., Damiano and Li, 2007, 2008) assume that agents
receive zero utility if they remain unmatched. Sometimes this assumption is relaxed by allowing
agents to receive some other value when unmatched, but this value is usually assumed the same
for all agents. However, in many markets (including dating or labor markets) agents differ in the
payoff they obtain when unmatched. It is not a trivial assumption, since equilibria in the market
change when we allow agents to differ in their utility of being alone.
Suppose that in our model the value of being alone is 0 for all agents. Then every agent prefers
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the market with as little competition as possible, and therefore as few candidates as possible. A
market with more candidates and more competition increases the probability of being rejected and
staying alone. With the payoff of being alone 0, the increase in the expected value of the best
candidate does not offset the increased probability of being rejected.
The assumption of the utility of being alone equal to 0 is an extreme assumption. Suppose that
the value of being alone is some ã from the interval (0, 1), but that it is the same for all agents.
Since agents are all the same when they make a decision whether to join the platform, they all
make the same decision. For some values of parameters Ω, N and ã there exists an equilibrium with
active matching platform. In this equilibrium all agents join the matching platform. There always
exists an equilibrium where no agent joins the platform. There are no other equilibria. Specifically,
there does not exist an equilibrium in which part of agents strictly prefers to participate in the
platform and other agents prefer to stay in the outside market.

5.2

Subjective value of a candidate, Λ

In a matching market, individuals may value their mates’ characteristics differently. Boyd
et al. (2003) documents such situation in the context of labor market. Employers may value
different characteristics of employees differently. Also employees may value different employers
subjectively; for example, teachers’ preferences for schools depend on the location. We could
expect that such subjectivity plays even larger role in the dating market, where the taste for the
partners is idiosyncratic.
And indeed, several decades of studies in economics, sociology and psychology suggest that
people differ in their valuation of characteristics of an ideal romantic partner (Eastwick et al.,
2011). Being kind, understanding, and intelligent are equally desired characteristics by both men
and women (Figueredo et al., 2006). However, people differ individually who they perceive as kind,
understanding and intelligent. And ultimately they differ in their assessment which candidates
are the most desirable to them. Other studies focusing on assortative mating find only small
positive correlations across romantic partners at the value of 0.20 (Buss and Barnes, 1986). This
subjectivity, however, has a limited span.
Formally, individuals match both on horizontal and vertical properties. In this dichotomy,
characteristics that are valued differently by different agents constitute horizontal attributes, and
characteristics that are similarly valued by everyone are vertical attributes. Most studies, particularly those that study dating and marriage markets using empirical methods, assume some
combination of vertical and horizontal preferences (Hitsch et al., 2010a,b; Banerjee et al., 2013;
Gomes and Pavan, 2015). Interestingly, whether an attribute is considered vertical or horizontal
21

may depend on the side of the market, i.e., may vary between men and women.
Other studies demonstrate that the importance of vertical and horizontal attributes follow a
sequential order such that once candidates are sorted based on a vertical attribute, the preferences
among them remain relatively horizontal (Abramitzky et al., 2011; Banerjee et al., 2013). Bruch
et al. (2016) study the search patterns of users in an online dating platform and demonstrate that
once women are sorted in an age group that is acceptable to a man, men’s preference for age
becomes horizontal.
While in most studies theoretically modeling matching agents are endowed with a vertical
attribute, which may be interpreted as objective “quality” (e.g., McAfee, 2002; Damiano and Li,
2007, 2008; Hoppe et al., 2011), some recent studies assume the other extreme, fully horizontal
preferences (e.g., Ashlagi et al., 2013). In our model, we also focus only on horizontal preferences:
the values of Λ are independent. That means that when two men meet a woman, the extent to
which one man likes the woman is independent of how much the other man likes her.
Unsurprisingly, the predictions of our model change if we impose vertical preferences, i.e., perfect
correlation between Λ’s and a’s. It turns out that in such a case, all agents are indifferent between
meeting fewer or more candidates. Under perfectly correlated a and Λ, an agent a would only
match with agent of the same type, gaining as much from the matching as staying alone, Λ = a.
To see this, note that a man am would not want to match with aw < am , because with perfect
correlation, he likes her less than begin alone Λm (w) = aw < am . He would like to match with a
woman that he likes more, Λm (w) > am , but she would prefer to be alone than to match with him,
as Λw (m) = am < Λm (w) = aw , so Λw (m) < aw . Thus, no matter how many candidates they meet,
or whether they stay unmatched, agents get the same payoff.
However, as documented by the the empirical studies above, matching markets involve a mixture
of vertical and horizontal preferences. Modelling the whole market with purely vertical or purely
horizontal preferences is not a realistic assumption. The literature showing sequential order where
once sorted according to vertical preferences, agents’ preferences become horizontal may justify
analysis of purely horizontal preferences on selection from the market (i.e., after candidates have
been separated according to their objective characteristics, as age or education).
More important, however, is to investigate whether the results of our analysis apply directly to
an environment characterized by a mixture of vertical and horizontal preferences. Such mixture
would be manifested in our model by an imperfect correlation between Λ’s and a’s. And indeed,
simulations in Section A.2 show that once we step away from perfect correlation (i.e., purely vertical
differences), the forces analyzed in our main model come into play, and the results hold even for
mixed environments, where Λ and a are imperfectly correlated.
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6

Conclusions

Theoretical literature on network effects suggests that agents should be rather attracted to a larger
than to a smaller network, because larger networks offer them access to broader set of candidates.
And a larger number of candidates allows the agents to find better matches. However, in practice,
we observe that platforms that restrict choice exist and prosper alongside platforms that offer more
choice. We propose a model that explains why an industry with network effects may experience
entry of a firm with a seemingly inferior product (restricted choice). Furthermore, we show that a
firm that offers such a product may charge higher prices and be more profitable than its competitors
who offer unrestricted choice.
As we show in our model, on a platform that offers more choice, agents also face more competition, as their candidates also enjoy a larger choice set.22 This gives rise to two opposing forces.
On the one hand, an agent is more likely to find an attractive match on a platform that offers
more candidates. On the other hand, she is less likely to be accepted by her chosen match on
such platform. Interestingly, the trade-off between the two forces is resolved differently by different
types of individuals.
Therefore, platforms that offer fewer choices than their competitors prosper because in markets with heterogeneous agents they can attract different types of agents. Accounting for such
heterogeneity is the first step in explaining why multiple platforms can coexist without the market
tipping.
A further important feature which our model reveals is that when agents choose a platform,
they self-select based on their characteristics. Platforms that restrict choice to all customers appeal
primarily to agents who are impatient or who have disutility from being alone. This is for two
reasons, (i) the candidates the agent encounters have a smaller choice set in the restricted-choice
platform, and (ii) due to self-selection, the candidates are also impatient or have disutility from
begin alone. Both work in the same direction and increase probability of being accepted. Agents
with more patience or higher utility of being alone rather use platforms that offer more choice. The
effect resulting from self-selection also explains why a platform limiting choice is able to charge a
higher price than the competitor offering more choice. Higher price makes joining the restricted
platform even less worthwhile for agents with higher utility of being alone. But keeping them out
increases the probability of acceptance on the restricted-choice platform, and therefore increases the
willingness to pay of agents with low utility of being alone for participating in the restricted-choice
platform. The larger the difference in fees charged, the greater are the differences, on average,
22

In our model we assume that a platform limits or increases the number of candidates offered to agents on both
sides of the market. Such co-movement is an inherent property of markets with indirect network effects.
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between participants of the different platforms.
While our paper captures the stylized facts of the online dating industry, it also delivers additional empirical predictions. Our model predicts that the demand for platform services is nonmonotonic in the number of candidates that the platform offers to its customers. Moreover,
restricted-choice platforms should have a higher probability of transaction occurring (or lower
expected time to transaction occurring).
Finally, our analysis has implications for managers seeking to enter into or compete in industries
with strong network effects. While prevailing wisdom suggests that offering a large choice set to
consumers on their platforms should benefit all consumers, our model shows that this intuition
may not always hold. Specifically, the received wisdom holds in markets where people do not
differ much in their utility of being unmatched, or where preferences are fairly homogeneous across
agents. However, when people significantly differ in their outside options, and when preferences
are subjective, managers may have more flexibility in how to compete and may want to enter the
market as a restricted-choice platform.

A

Appendix

A.1

Tentative Offers

The main model assumes that agents can make only a single offer. The goal of this assumption
is to reflect the fact that people are able to pursue only limited number of possible relationships.
Limiting the number to one is extreme. This section shows that the qualitative results of the model
hold for some other, more realistic, offer-making procedures.
In this section, we analyze a two-step offer-making procedure for an environment where agents
can pursue multiple relationships. After the agents meet their candidates and observe how much
they like them, they proceed to making offers. In the first stage they can send a fixed number of
tentative offers. Simultaneously, other agents send their tentative offers. Every agent observes the
tentative offers he or she has received, before sending a one final offer in the second stage. The final
offers are also sent simultaneously. As before, only if the final offer is reciprocated, the relationship
is formed. Otherwise, both agents remain unmatched. We assume that if agents are indifferent
between sending an offer (tentative or final) or not, they do not send it. This eliminates a possible
situation when agents send tentative offers to candidates that they like less than being alone, but
are sure to be rejected by.
We show here that even with the two-step offer-making procedure there are limits to network
effects through the same forces as in the base model. Adding a tentative offer to the procedure
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increases the overall probability of a successful match. However, when the number of feasible
tentative offers is fixed, but the number of candidates increases, agents with lower utility of being
alone prefer markets with fewer candidates, while agents with higher utility of staying alone prefer
markets with more candidates. A fixed number of tentative offers reflects in a more realistic way
the limitations to how many potential relations people can pursue.23 This section illustrates this
point through an example of the market with two tentative offers allowed. However, the results
can be extended for any fixed number of tentative offers.
Consider an equilibrium where every agent makes the tentative offers to his two best candidates,
provided that at least two candidates are above the reservation threshold. Otherwise, the agent
makes a tentative offer to the best candidate — if the best candidate is above the reservation
threshold — or to no candidates, if no candidates are above the threshold. If an agent got a
tentative offer from his best candidate, he makes the final offer to this candidate. If an agent did
not get a tentative offer from the best candidate, but got one from the second-best candidate, then
the agent makes the final offer to the second-best candidate. If the agent did not get a tentative
offer either from the best or the second-best candidate, he does not make a final offer and remains
unmatched.24
For the purpose of the comparative statics we are looking for, we need to find the expected
payoff of agent a when everyone meets N ≥ 2 candidates. An agent gets a tentative offer from a
particular candidate when he is either the first or the second choice of this candidate, and he is
above the candidate’s reservation value. An agent is the first choice of a candidate (and above the
reservation value) with a probability
P r(best|N ) =

1
.
N +1

An agent is the second choice of a candidate (and above the reservation value) with a probability
Z
P r(2nd|N ) =
0

1Z 1

a

(N − 1)(1 − G(Λ))GN −2 (Λ)g(Λ)g(a)dΛda =

23

N −1
.
N (N + 1)

In a labor market, it reflects the fact that an agent can go to only a limited number of interviews. In the case of
an auction site, an agent can follow only a limited number of ongoing auctions.
24
There are also other equilibria possible. All have the following structure: Let ΛM AX be the Λ of the best
candidate. If agent a got a tentative offer from a candidate whose Λ is at least x(ΛM AX ), he makes the final offer
to the best of such candidates, even if he did not make a tentative offer to this candidate. If the agent did not get
a tentative offer from any of the candidates above x(ΛM AX ), he makes the final offer to his best candidate, even
though he did not receive a tentative offer from this candidate. The additional probability of successfully matching
in such equilibrium is very small and decreasing with the number of candidates. Therefore, it does not change the
qualitative results of this section.
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Thus, the probability that the agent gets a tentative offer from a particular candidate is
P r(tentative|N ) = P r(best|N ) + P r(2nd|N ) =

2N − 1
.
N (N + 1)

An agent makes the final offer to the best candidate when he got a tentative offer from this
candidate, and he likes the candidate more than being alone. However, it may be that the agent has
not got a tentative offer from the best candidate, but he got one from the second-best candidate. If
this is the case, and the second-best candidate is above the reservation threshold, the agent makes
the final offer to the second-best candidate.
The agent gets the final offer when he is the most preferred candidate, or when he is the secondbest candidate, but the best candidate did not make a tentative offer. Moreover, the agent gets
the final offer from a candidate only if both he and the candidate made tentative offers to each
other. The probability that the candidate makes a tentative offer is already incorporated in the
probability of getting the final offer. But we need to remember that the agent makes a tentative
offer to the best or the second-best candidate only if the candidate is above the reservation value a.
That is, the probability of getting both the tentative and the final offers is
h
i
N2 + 1
2N − 1
·
.
P r(f inal|N ) = P r(best|N ) + P r(2nd|N ) · 1 − P r(tentative|N ) =
N (N + 1) N (N + 1)
The agent matches with the best candidate when he received a tentative and the final offers
from that candidate and the candidate was better than being alone. The probability that the best
candidate out of N is above a is 1 − G(a)N . Therefore, the agent matches with the best candidate
with probability
P r(match best|N, a) =


2N − 1
N2 + 1
·
1 − GN (a) .
N (N + 1) N (N + 1)

The agent matches with the second best candidate when he received a tentative and final offer from
that candidate, the second-best candidate was better than being alone, and he did not receive a
tentative offer from the best candidate. The probability that the second-best candidate is above a
is
Z
N (N − 1)

1

a

GN −2 (Λ)(1 − G(Λ))g(Λ)dΛ = 1 − GN (a) − N · GN −1 (a)(1 − G(a)) .
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Thus, the agent matches with the second-best candidate with probability


P r(match 2nd|N, a) = 1−P r(tentative|N ) ·P r(f inal|N )· 1−GN (a)−N ·GN −1 (a)(1−G(a)) =



2N − 1
2N − 1
N2 + 1
= 1−
·
· 1 − GN (a) − N · GN −1 (a)(1 − G(a)) .
N (N + 1) N (N + 1) N (N + 1)
With the remaining probability of
1 − P r(match best|N, a) − P r(match 2nd|N, a) =



= 1 − P r(f inal|N ) 1 − GN (a) + 1 − P r(tentative|N ) 1 − GN (a) − N · GN −1 (a)(1 − G(a)) =





2N − 1
2N − 1
N2 + 1
1 − GN (a) + 1 −
1 − GN (a) − N · GN −1 (a)(1 − G(a))
1−
·
N (N + 1) N (N + 1)
N (N + 1)
the agent remains unmatched and receives the payoff of a.
The expected payoff from matching with the best candidate out of N is
Z
EU (match best|a, N ) = N

1

a

GN −1 (Λ)Λg(Λ)dΛ = 1 − aGN (a) −

Z

1

a

GN (Λ)dΛ

The expected payoff from matching with the second-best candidate out of N is
Z 1
EU (match 2nd|a, N ) =
N (N − 1)GN −2 (Λ)(1 − G(Λ))g(Λ)ΛdΛ
a
Z 1
Z 1
N −2
=N
(N − 1)G
(Λ)g(Λ)ΛdΛ −(N − 1)
N GN −1 (Λ)g(Λ)ΛdΛ
|a
{z
}
|a
{z
}
EU (match best|a,N −1)
EU (match best|a,N )




Z 1
Z 1
N −1
N −1
N
N
= N 1 − aG
(a) −
G
(Λ)dΛ − (N − 1) 1 − aG (a) −
G (Λ)dΛ
a
a
Therefore, the expected payoff for agent a in a market where two tentative offers are allowed
and there are N candidates is
EU (a|N ) =

= P r(f inal|N ) · EU (match best|a, N ) + 1 − P r(tentative|N ) P r(f inal|N ) · EU (match 2nd|a, N )
h

i
+ a · 1 − P r(f inal|N ) 1 − GN (a) + 1 − P r(tentative|N ) 1 − GN (a) − N GN −1 (a)(1 − G(a))
"




Z 1
(2N − 1)(N 2 + 1)
2N − 1
2N − 1
=
GN (Λ)dΛ
2−
(1 − a) + (N − 1) 1 −
−1
N 2 (N + 1)2
N (N + 1)
N (N + 1)
a
#

Z 1
2N − 1
− 1−
N GN −1 (Λ)dΛ + a
N (N + 1)
a
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Consider the difference EU (a|N + 1) − EU (a|N ) ≥ 0. We can use the same approach as in
the proof of Proposition 1 to show that there are limits to network effects. Albeit, the function
corresponding to function F (x) in Lemma B.1 is much more complicated for tentative offers. But
the relevant properties still hold.
Figure A.1 graphically shows this result for uniform distribution. The shaded region is where
EU (a|N + 1) − EU (a|N ) ≥ 0 given a and N . We can see that all agents prefer N = 3 to N = 2,
but it is no longer true for larger N ’s. Agents with lower a’s (the white region) prefer a market
with fewer candidates (N ) than a market with more candidates (N + 1). Thus, with two tentative
offers, the basic tradeoff between the choice and competition effect plays out in the same way as in
the base model. Similarly to Proposition 1, the optimal number of candidates is weakly increasing
with the utility of being alone.
10
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Figure A.1: Region where EU (a|N + 1) − EU (a|N ) ≥ 0 holds for uniform distribution. Agents in
the shaded region prefer a market with N + 1 candidates to a market with N candidates.
Interestingly, if there is no limit on tentative offers (i.e., one can always make tentative offers
to all candidates above the reservation value, as the number of candidates increases), then the
probability of matching with someone above the reservation value increases with the number of
candidates. There is no trade-off, and all agents always prefer to meet more candidates.
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A.2

Correlation Between Outside Options and Preferences

In the main body of the paper, we assumed that an agent’s outside option (a) has no effect on how
much others like him (Λ). This assumption allows us to claim that agents always want to match
with those whom they like the most and enables us to develop a closed-form solution to our model.
There are, however, a number of reasons to believe that an agent’s outside option may be
correlated with how much others like the agent. If these two values are positively correlated, one
can no longer assume that agents will want to make an offer to the candidate whom they like the
most. With positive correlation, a man knows that his top choice woman is likely to have a high
outside option and that other men will rank her highly as well. Whether the man will make an
offer to his first choice woman will depend on his own outside option, am . If his outside option am
is high, he knows that his first choice woman derives a high value from being matched with him,
as am correlates with her Λw for him. He will prefer to make an offer to her since she is unlikely to
reject him. In contrast, if the man’s outside option is low, he knows that his top choice woman is
likely to derive a low value from a match with him and therefore she will likely reject his offer. He
may, therefore, consider making an offer to his 2nd or 3rd choice women instead. Even though these
lower ranked choices give him lower value from a match, his probability of rejection with these
candidates is also likely to be lower compared to his first choice woman. As long as the decline in
his value from a successful match is offset by the increase in his probability of match, he may be
better off making an offer to his 2nd or 3rd choice rather than his first choice.
Unfortunately, there is no closed form solution in this setup. To overcome this issue, we generate
insights based on a numerical simulation. The simulation extends the main model by allowing for
correlation (denoted by h) between agents’ outside options (a) and how much others like them (Λ),
and gives us insights about what happens to the expected utilities and network effects with positive
correlation.
A.2.1

Simulation Setup

The expected utility of an agent a from making an offer to a candidate relies on two pieces
of information: the probability that the candidate is going to accept this offer, and how much
he likes the candidate. Accordingly, the numerical simulation we build first aims to establish a
“lookup table”, which is an approximation to a probability of acceptance matrix. This table lists
the probability that an agent with outside option a will have his offer reciprocated by a candidate
he likes at Λ. More specifically, discretizing the [0,1] space in increments of 0.1, we generate
an 11 × 11 matrix, where the rows indicate the range in which the man’s outside option falls
a ∈ {[0, 0.1) ∪ [0.1, 0.2) ∪ [0.2, 0.3)... ∪ [0.9, 1) ∪ [1]} and the columns indicate the Λ values of the
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candidate met, Λ ∈ {[0, 0.1) ∪ [0.1, 0.2) ∪ [0.2, 0.3)... ∪ [0.9, 1) ∪ [1]}.25 Element ij of the matrix
indicates the probability that a man (woman) of outside option a will receive an offer from a
candidate he (she) likes at Λ, conditional on h and N . In the second part of the simulation, using
the lookup table, we generate the expected utility of a representative agent with outside option
a = {0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 1} from being on the platform and check for the limits to positive network effects.
The basic simulation aims at checking robustness of Proposition 1 to positive correlation, as the
economic forces behind Proposition 1 are the main driving forces of all the following results. To
do that, we manipulate the environment by changing N ≥ 1 and the correlation between agents’
outside options and how much others like them, in increments of 0.2 (h = 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8).
This implies that the restricted platform gives agents N candidates each of whom meets N − 1
other candidates. We simulate the lookup table and the expected utility of an agent from having
N = 1, 2, ....Y candidates, where Y is the maximum number of agents tested.26
The lookup table is generated with the help of an outer and an inner loop. The simulation
starts by setting some initial numbers to the lookup table. We set the initialization values to 1/N .
In each iteration of the outer loop, we update the lookup table using the results from the inner
loop. In the inner loop, we simulate the choices of the candidates met in order to backtrack the
probabilities of acceptance for an agent. More specifically, in each iteration of the inner loop, we
simulate the choices of N men and N women, given the lookup table. We draw the outside options
of the men and women (am , aw ), and conditional on their outside options and the correlation in the
market, we also draw how much each agent with an outside option a likes each candidate met, where
Λ ∼ U [ah, 1 − h(1 − a)]. Recall that the correlation between Λ and a is determined by a population
level parameter h, which is assumed to vary from zero to one. In particular, for each candidate, a
Λ value is drawn from a uniform distribution between ah and 1 − h(1 − a). Notice that when h = 0,
Λ is drawn from a standard uniform distribution between 0 and 1, and is thus independent of the
candidate’s outside option, a (this construction reflects our main model). In contrast, for example
if h = 0.5, how much a candidate is liked (Λ) is drawn from a uniform distribution between 0.5a
and 0.5 + 0.5a, implying that the Λ value depends on a. In the extreme case, when h = 1, how
much others like the candidate is fully determined by the outside option of this agent, equaling a.
In this case, the agent’s payoff does not depend on N , as it is always equal to the agent’s outside
options, as explained in Section 5.2. Therefore, we do not run the simulation for h = 1.
Using the lookup table and how much each candidate is liked, the agent a chooses the candidate
who maximizes his expected utility. These choices are tracked in the inner loop. When the iterations
25

Since the probability of drawing an a or a Λ value equal to 1, although empirically possible in any single iteration
of the simulation, approaches zero both in theory and in the simulation.
26
In our simulations, we let this number go as high 150.
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for the inner loop are complete,27 we update the look up table conditional on the number of times
a man a in row i was chosen by a woman he liked at value Λ in column j, by dividing the number
of times he was chosen by the woman with the number of times he met a candidate he liked at Λ
in column j. After the inner loop is complete, we update the lookup table before going to the next
run of the inner loop. With this procedure we aim at reaching a steady state in the lookup table.28
In the second part of the simulation, using the lookup table generated in the first part of the
simulation, we simulate the utility of a representative agent at a = 0 to a = 0.9, in increments of
0.1.29 The utility values from each iteration is noted, and averaged over a number of iterations.
A.2.2

Results

Our objective of the simulation is to test whether the limits to positive network effects exist when
the desirability of a candidate is correlated with his outside options. The results demonstrate that
for the tested levels of correlation (0 to 0.8, in increments of 0.2) the curvilinear relationship between
the number of candidates a platform offers and an agent’s expected utility from participating in the
platform is maintained. Specifically, echoing part (i) of Proposition 1, we find that agents derive
utility from each additional candidate offered to them on the platform, as long as the number of
candidates offered to them does not exceed a specific threshold. Beyond this threshold, agents prefer
(a platform with) fewer choices. This result confirms that the qualitative results from our model hold
even when the outside options of agents influence how much others like them. Put differently, under
correlated preferences, there still are limits to positive network effects and a platform which restricts
choice can still provide higher utility compared to another platform which does not. Figures A.2–
A.4 visually represent the limits to positive network effects for h = 0, 0.4, 08.30
Second, we find that the threshold at which agents begin to prefer platforms offering fewer
choices over platforms that offer more choices increases in the agent’s outside option value. For
example, when h = 0.4 an agent with outside option value a = 0.4 prefers when the platform offers
two candidates rather than three candidates. And an agent with a relatively higher outside option
such as a = 0.6 prefers four candidates on the platform to any other number of candidates. This
finding is very consistent with the intuition from part (ii) of Proposition 1. Recall that agents with
low outside options care about finding a match who may reciprocate their offer. For these agents,
27

The iterations ranged between 300–1000, depending on the computational time it took for a run. For higher
values of N , the run time is longer and therefore we used lower number of iterations.
28
We also run the outer loop 300–1000 times depending on N . For larger N , we set smaller number of iterations
to reduce the computational time.
29
An agent with a = 1 is expected to receive a utility of 1 independent of N and h, and although we generate the
simulation results to confirm this expectation, we are not reporting a = 1 in the results.
30
Graphs for h = 0.2 and 0.6 are similar and available upon request.
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Figure A.2: Limits to Positive Network Effects, h = 0

a platform offering fewer candidates, where they will have less competition with same side agents,
is attractive. In contrast, agents with high outside options care about obtaining a high match
value. For them, a platform offering higher number of candidates one of whom can exceed their
high outside option, is more attractive. Those forces still hold for positive correlation.31

Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1:
(i) With N candidates, a woman that the man meets has N + 1 possible actions: to make an
offer to one of the N candidates and to make no offer (when aw is larger than any of the
relevant Λ’s). All Λ’s and aw are drawn independently from the same distribution. Therefore,
without knowing aw , each of the actions is equally likely.
(ii) The agent makes an offer to the best Λ, if the highest Λ is above a. The highest Λ is above
31
We have tested the limits to network effects also in an environment with two competing platforms where the
restricted platform offers one less candidate to agents than the non-restricted platform, and charges a higher fee. The
results from the simulation show that findings in this environment when h > 0 are qualitatively similar to the results
of Proposition 2. Since this more involved simulation requires a lengthy description but does not offer new insights,
these results are available upon request.
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Figure A.3: Limits to Positive Network Effects, h = 0.4
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Figure A.4: Limits to Positive Network Effects, h = 0.8
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a with probability 1 − GN (a). Independently, the best Λ makes an offer to agent a with
probability

1
N +1

(from point (1) of this Lemma).

(iii) Unconditional expected value of a match is P r(accepted) · E(max Λ| max Λ > a). Thus, the
value of matching, conditional on being accepted is E(max Λ| max Λ > a).
To find the conditional expected value of E(max Λ| max Λ > a), we first characterize the distribution function of max Λ under N candidates. Notice that the cdf of max Λ is P r(max Λ <
∂GN (x)
∂x

x) = GN (x). Thus, the pdf is

= N GN −1 (x)g(x). Using the probability density, we

calculate the expected value of max Λ, given that max Λ > a:
Z

1

a

N GN −1 (x)g(x) · xdx = N

Z

1

a

GN −1 (x)g(x)xdx .

(iv) Follows directly from parts (i), (ii) and (iii) of the Lemma.
This completes the proof of Lemma 1.

2

Proof of Corollary 1: Using integration by parts,
Z
N

1

a

G

N −1

N

1

Z

1

GN (x)dx =
Z 1
Z 1
GN (x)dx = 1 − GN (a)a −
GN (x)dx
= GN (1) · 1 − GN (a)a −
a
a

(x)g(x)xdx = G (x)x a −

a

R1
Since G(x) ≤ 1 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, GN (x) is nonincreasing with N for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 and a GN (x)dx is
R1
nonincreasing with N , 1 − GN (a)a − a GN (x)dx is nondecreasing with N . 2

Lemma B.1 Consider an arbitrary â ∈ [0, 1).
(i) When EU (â|N + 1) − EU (â|N ) ≥ 0, then for all a ∈ (â, 1), EU (a|N + 1) − EU (a|N ) > 0.
(ii) When EU (â|N + 1) − EU (â|N ) ≤ 0, then for all a ∈ [0, â), EU (a|N + 1) − EU (a|N ) < 0.

Proof of Lemma B.1: Notice that
Z 1
 N

1
EU (a|N + 1) − EU (a|N ) =
G (x) − 1 + (N + 1)GN (x)(1 − G(x)) dx .
(N + 1)(N + 2) a
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R1
Let’s identify the sign of a F (x)dx, where
F (x) = GN (x) − 1 + (N + 1)GN (x)(1 − G(x)) .
R1
It is useful to learn the shape of F (x) to determine the sign of a F (x)dx. For x = 0, F (x) = −1,
and for x = 1, F (x) = 0. Moreover, it is single peaked: increasing for x < x̂ and decreasing for
x > x̂, with maximum at x̂ s.t. G(x̂) =

(N +1)2 −1
.
(N +1)2

Since for x ∈ (x̂, 1], F (x) decreases and F (1) = 0, then F (x̂) > 0. Moreover, F (0) = −1 and
ˆ ∈ (0, x̂) s.t. F (x̂)
ˆ = 0.
for x ∈ [0, x̂), F (x) increases. Therefore, ∃x̂
R1
Now, suppose â F (x)dx ≥ 0. Take a > â. Then
Z

1

a

Z
F (x)dx =

Z â

1

â

F (x)dx −

a

F (x)dx .

R
ˆ then F (x) < 0 for all x ∈ [â, a),
ˆ then F (x) > 0 for all x > a, so 1 F (x)dx > 0. If a ≤ x̂,
If a > x̂,
a
Ra
so â F (x)dx < 0 and
Z

1

a

Z
F (x)dx =

Z a

1

â

F (x)dx −

â

Z
F (x)dx >

1

â

F (x)dx ≥ 0 .

R1
For the second part of the lemma, suppose that â F (x)dx ≤ 0, and take a < â. For
R1
R
ˆ
ˆ 1
â F (x)dx ≤ 0 it must be that â < x̂. This is because for all y > x̂, y F (x)dx > 0. Then
R â
R1
a F (x)dx < 0, and so a F (x)dx < 0. This completes the proof of the lemma. 2

Proof of Proposition 1: Let ∆(a|N ) = EU (a|N + 1) − EU (a|N )
Step 1. Function F (x), defined and characterized in the proof of Lemma B.1, is decreasing in N ,
for any x. We show that F (x, N ) − F (x, N + 1) > 0.
GN (x) − 1 + (N + 1)GN (x)(1 − G(x)) − GN +1 (x) + 1 − (N + 2)GN +1 (x)(1 − G(x)) =
= GN (x)(1 − G(x)) + (N + 1)GN (x)(1 − G(x)) − (N + 2)GN +1 (x)(1 − G(x)) =
= (N + 2)GN (x)(1 − G(x)) − (N + 2)GN +1 (x)(1 − G(x)) =
= (N + 2)GN (x)(1 − G(x))(1 − G(x)) > 0

Step 2. ∆(a|N ) is decreasing in N , for any a. The fact that F (x, N + 1) < F (x, N ) may not be
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enough to prove
∆(a|N + 1)
|
{z
}

R
= a1

<

F (x,N +1)
dx
(N +2)(N +3)

R
= a1

∆(a|N )
| {z }

F (x,N )
dx
(N +1)(N +2)

However, we can show that for any x
F (x, N )
F (x, N + 1)
<
,
(N + 2)(N + 3)
(N + 1)(N + 2)
because F (x, N + 1) < F (x, N ) and

1
N +3

<

1
N +1 .

Since at every point the integrated function is

smaller, the integral also needs to be smaller. Alternatively:
Z 1
F (x, N + 1)
F (x, N )
∆(a|N + 1) − ∆(a|N ) =
dx −
dx =
(N
+
2)(N
+
3)
(N
+
1)(N + 2)
a
a


Z 1
F (x, N )
F (x, N + 1)
−
dx < 0 ,
=
a (N + 2)(N + 3) (N + 1)(N + 2)
Z

1

because at any point x the integrated function is negative.
Step 3. For any a, there exists finite N such that ∆(a|N ) < 0. Suppose that ∆(a|1) > 0 (otherwise
N̄ (a) = 1 and the lemma is satisfied). For every x ∈ (0, 1), F (x) →N →∞ −1. Hence, as N goes to
R1
infinity, a F (x)dx → −(1 − a) < 0. Then, there must be an N such that ∆(a|N ) < 0. Let N̄ (a)
be the smallest N such that ∆(a|N ) < 0. Therefore, for every a there exists such N̄ (a). From Step
2., we know that ∆(a|N ) is (strictly) decreasing in N for any a. Therefore, for any N < N̄ (a),
∆(a|N ) is positive, and for any N ≥ N̄ (a) it is negative.
Step 4. N̄ (a) is non-decreasing in a. For any a0 and a00 such that a00 > a0 , we show that N̄ (a00 ) ≥
N̄ (a0 ). Let N 0 ≡ N̄ (a0 ). That is ∆(a0 |N ) > 0 for N < N 0 and ∆(a0 |N ) < 0 for N ≥ N 0 . Now
consider a00 > a0 . According to the previous lemma, when ∆(a0 |N ) > 0, then ∆(a00 |N ) > 0.
Therefore, for N < N 0 , ∆(a00 |N ) > 0. Since for every a there exists N̄ (a) (Step 3), it must be that
for a00 , N̄ (a00 ) ≥ N 0 .

2

Lemma B.2 For Ω > N ,

GN (a)−GΩ (a)
1−GN (a)

is strictly increasing on a ∈ (0, 1).

Proof of Lemma B.2: Consider only a ∈ [0, 1]. Let x = Ω − N > 0. The derivative of
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GN (a)−GΩ (a)
1−GN (a)

=

GN (a)−GN +x (a)
1−GN (a)

with respect to a is then

[N GN −1 (a)g(a) − (N + x)GN +x−1 (a)g(a)](1 − GN (a)) + N GN −1 (a)g(a)GN (a)(1 − Gx (a))
=
(1 − GN (a))2

GN −1 (a)g(a) 
[N − (N + x)Gx (a)](1 − GN (a)) + N GN (a)(1 − Gx (a)) =
=
N
2
(1 − G (a))
GN −1 (a)g(a)
=
[N − (N + x)Gx (a) + xGN +x (a)]
{z
}
(1 − GN (a))2 |
{z
}
|
X(N,x,a)
+

The sign of the derivative is the same as the sign of X(N, x, a). We claim that X(N, x, a) is positive.
First, notice that for a = 1, X(N, x, 1) = 0. Moreover, the derivative of X(N, x, a) with respect to
a is negative:
x(N + x) Gx−1 (a)g(a) (GN (a) − 1) < 0 .
{z
}|
{z
}
| {z } |
+

−

+

This is enough to establish that X(N, x, a) is positive. In addition notice that X(N, x, a = 0) =
N > 0.
Therefore

GN (a)−GΩ (a)
1−GN (a)

is strictly increasing for Ω > N .

2

Proof of Lemma 2: Agent a’s willingness to pay to join platform N is equal to the additional
expected payoff that the agent can get by joining the platform, i.e., W T P (a) = EU (a|N )−EU (a|Ω),
where
N

Z

N

1

EU (a|N ) = [G (a) + (1 − G (a))P r(rej|N )]a + (1 − P r(rej|N )) · N
GN +1 (x)g(x)xdx
a
Z 1
= 1 + P r(rej|N )(a − 1) − (1 − P r(rej|N ))
GN (x)dx
a
Z 1
EU (a|Ω) = [GΩ (a) + (1 − GΩ (a))P r(rej|Ω)]a + (1 − P r(rej|Ω)) · N
GΩ+1 (x)g(x)xdx
a
Z 1
= 1 + P r(rej|Ω)(a − 1) − (1 − P r(rej|Ω))
GΩ (x)dx
a
Then,
W T P (a) = EU (a|N ) − EU (a|Ω) =
Z

1

Z

1

= (1 − a)[P r(rej|Ω) − P r(rej|N )] − [1 − P r(rej|N )]
G (x)dx + [1 − P r(rej|Ω)]
GΩ (x)dx =
a
a


Z 1
Z 1
Ω
N
N
= [1 − P r(rej|Ω)]
[G (x) − G (x)]dx + [P r(rej|Ω) − P r(rej|N )] · 1 − a −
G (x)dx
a
a
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N

Notice that for a = 1, W T P (a = 1) = 0; for a = 0, W T P may be positive or negative.
∂W T P (a)
= (1 − P r(rej|Ω)) · [GN (a) − GΩ (a)] − (P r(rej|Ω) − P r(rej|N )) · (1 − GN (a))
∂a
∂W T P (a)
GN (a) − GΩ (a)
P r(rej|Ω) − P r(rej|N )
< 0 ⇐⇒
<
N
∂a
1 − G (a)
1 − P r(rej|Ω)
We consider N < Ω. Then GN (a) − GΩ (a) > 0. From Lemma B.2 we know that
is strictly increasing. Moreover, it takes value 0 for a = 0, and
If P r(rej|N ) < P r(rej|Ω), then
Ω−N
N ,

P r(rej|Ω)−P r(rej|N )
1−P r(rej|Ω)

Ω−N
N

GN (a)−GΩ (a)
1−GN (a)

> 0 as a → 1.

is a positive constant. When

P r(rej|Ω)−P r(rej|N )
1−P r(rej|Ω)

the W T P (a) is decreasing on the whole interval a ∈ [0, 1), and hence everywhere positive.

When

P r(rej|Ω)−P r(rej|N )
1−P r(rej|Ω)

<

Ω−N
N ,

the W T P (a) is decreasing for small a’s, and increasing for

large a’s. But since for a = 1, W T P = 0, W T P must increase to 0 from negative values. Therefore,
for a’s where W T P (a) > 0, W T P is strictly decreasing.

2

Corollary B.1 For any given P r(rej|N ) and P r(rej|Ω) < P r(rej|N ) and for any Ω and N < Ω,
the willingness to pay W T P (a) = EU (a|N, P r(rej|N )) − EU (a|Ω, P r(rej|Ω)) is non-positive for
a ∈ [0, 1].
Proof of Corollary B.1: Consider W T P from the proof of Lemma 2, and suppose N < Ω. If
N (a)−GΩ (a)
r(rej|N )
< 0 while G 1−G
P r(rej|N ) > P r(rej|Ω), then P r(rej|Ω)−P
> 0. Therefore ∂W T∂ aP (a) >
N (a)
1−P r(rej|Ω)
0, i.e., W T P is strictly increasing everywhere. And since W T P (a = 1) = 0, then W T P (a) is
negative for a ∈ [0, 1). Thus, no agent has a positive willingness to pay to join a platform offering
fewer candidates and higher probability of rejection.

2

Corollary B.2 When fee f = 0, then b
a(f=0) = 1. That is, all agents prefer to join the platform
if the fee is the same as for participating on the outside market.
Proof of Corollary B.2: It follows from the fact that EU (b
a|N ) − EU (b
a|Ω) is positive on the
interval [0, 1). Agents with a ∈ [0, 1) prefer to join when f = 0, and agents with a = 1 are
indifferent.

2

Proof of Proposition 2: Let N < Ω. Suppose that agents then expect P r(rej|N ) < P r(rej|Ω).
From Lemma 2, we know that in such a case, on the interval a ∈ [0, ā) for ā < 1 willingness
to pay is positive and decreasing (and continuous). Therefore, the WTP is highest for a = 0,
W T P (a = 0) > 0. Thus, for any fee f < W T P (a = 0) there exists a0 such that f = W T P (a0 ). All
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>

agents with a < a0 have higher willingness to pay than f . Thus, they will pay the fee and join the
platform, and the platform collects profits G(a0 ) · W T P (a0 ). In an equilibrium, the expectations
need to be fulfilled. Since for given f agents with a < a0 join the platform, and those with a > a0
stay outside:
GN (a0 )
1
+
N
N (N + 1)
1
1 − GΩ+1 (a0 )
1
P r(rej|Ω, a ∈ (a0 , 1]) = 1 − +
Ω Ω(Ω + 1) 1 − G(a0 )

P r(rej|N, a ∈ [0, a0 )) = 1 −

Notice that P r(rej|Ω, a ∈ (a0 , 1]) > P r(rej|N, a ∈ [0, a0 ))

P r(rej|Ω, a ∈ (a0 , 1]) − P r(rej|N, a ∈ [0, a0 )) > 0


1
1 − GΩ+1 (a0 )
1
GN (a0 )
1
−
1
−
+
>0
1− +
Ω Ω(Ω + 1) 1 − G(a0 )
N
N (N + 1)
GN (a0 )
1
1
1
1 − GΩ+1 (a0 )
− +
−
)>0
0
N
Ω Ω(Ω + 1) 1 − G(a )
N (N + 1)
1 − GΩ+1 (a0 )
− Ω(Ω + 1)GN (a0 ) > 0
Ω(Ω + 1)(N + 1) − N (N + 1)(Ω + 1) + N (N + 1)
1 − G(a0 )

1 − GΩ+1 (a0 )
Ω(Ω + 1)N − N (N + 1)(Ω + 1) + N (N + 1)
+ Ω(Ω + 1) 1 − GN (a0 ) > 0
1 − G(a0 )

1 − GΩ+1 (a0 )
N (Ω + 1) (Ω − N − 1) +N (N + 1)
+ Ω(Ω + 1) 1 − GN (a0 ) > 0
{z
}
|
1 − G(a0 )
≥0

All other terms are strictly positive. Moreover, notice that for a = 0 and for a = ā, the profit
G(a) · W T P (a) = 0. But for a ∈ (0, ā) both a and W T P (a) are positive, so G(a) · W T P (a) > 0.
Let a∗ be the value that maximizes platform’s profit. Then it must be that a∗ ∈ (0, ā) and
G(a∗ ) · W T P (a∗ ) > 0.

2

Proof of Lemma 3: We obtain the result by differentiating
Z
EU (a|M2 , P r(rej|M2 )) − a = 1 − P r(rej|M2 )(a − 1) − (1 − P r(rej|M2 ))

1

a

GM2 (x)dx − a

with respect to a:
∂(EU (a|M2 , P r(rej|M2 )) − a)
=
∂a


P r(rej|M2 ) + [1 − P r(rej|M2 )] GM2 (a) − 1 = [1 − P r(rej|M2 )] GM2 (a) − 1 < 0 .
|
{z
}
−
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Thus, EU (a|M2 , P r(rej|M2 )) is decreasing on the whole range of a.
Moreover, EU (a|M2 , P r(rej|M2 )) − a evaluated at a = 1 is:
1 + P r(rej|M2 ) · 0 − (1 − P r(rej|M2 )) · 0 − 1 = 0.
2
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose M1 < M2 . Lemma 3 and Corollary 3 help characterize the
agents’ decisions about which platform to join, if any, given f1 , f2 < f1 , P r(rej|M1 ), P r(rej|M2 ) >
P r(rej|M2 ).
Agents with a < â2 prefer M2 to being unmatched, and those with a > â2 prefer being unmatched to M2 . Agents with a < â1 prefer M1 to M2 , and those with a > â1 prefer M2 to M1 .
If â1 > â2 , no agent chooses to join platform M2 .
When â1 < â2 , agents with a < â1 choose M1 , agents with a ∈ (â1 , â2 ) choose M2 , and agents
with a > â2 stay unmatched. When this is the case, then the resulting rejection probabilities are
indeed Pr(rej|M1 , a ∈ [0, â1 )) < P r(rej|M2 , a ∈ (â1 , â2 )).
Thresholds â1 and â2 depend on f1 and f2 , which are set by the platforms. Platforms take into
account the resulting decisions of agents when setting their fees. Notice that f1 and f2 uniquely
characterize â1 (f1 , f2 ) and â2 (f1 , f2 ). Therefore, we can think of the platforms as effectively choosing a∗i given a∗j .
Platforms’ profits are a product of their fees and the measure of agents who join them. First,
notice that platform M1 would never set â1 = 1, as it would require f1 = 0 (to attract a = 1), and
would result in 0 profits, while positive profits for other â1 are available. Similarly, platform M1
never sets f1 so high that â1 = 0, as it also results in 0 profits.
Next, notice that platform M2 would never set â2 ≤ â1 , as it would bring it 0 profit. Also,
setting â2 = 1 would require f2 = 0, and would result in 0 profits, therefore, is suboptimal for M2 .
Thus, in an equilibrium 0 < â1 < â2 < 1. To show that such an equilibrium exists, we turn to
analyzing platforms’ best response curves. The profits are
π1 (â1 |â2 ) =G(â1 ) · f1 (â1 , â2 )
π2 (â2 |â1 ) =(G(â2 ) − G(â1 )) · f2 (â1 , â2 ) ,
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where f1 and f2 are characterized by the indifference conditions
f2 (â1 , â2 ) = EU (â2 |M2 ) − â2
f1 (â1 , â2 ) = EU (â1 |M1 ) − EU (â1 |M2 ) + f2 =
= EU (â1 |M1 ) − EU (â1 |M2 ) + EU (â2 |M2 ) − â2
The best responses â1 (â2 ) and â2 (â1 ) satisfy first order conditions32
∂π1
=G0 (â1 ) (EU (â1 |M1 ) − EU (â1 |M2 ) + EU (â2 |M2 ) − â2 )
∂â1


∂ [EU (â1 |M1 ) − EU (â1 |M2 )] ∂ EU (â2 |M2 )
+ G(â1 )
+
=0
∂ â1
∂ â1


∂π2
∂ EU (â2 |M2 )
0
=G (â2 ) (EU (â2 |M2 ) − â2 ) + (G(â2 ) − G(â1 ))
− 1 = 0.
∂â2
∂ â2
We don’t know the exact shape of the best response curves. But we still can characterize certain
aspects of them. First, consider the best response of platform M1 to â2 set by M2 . When â2 = 0,
M1 is de facto a monopolist, where the outside option for the agents is to stay unmatched. The
optimal â1 (â2 = 0) ∈ (0, 1). When â2 = 1 (i.e., f2 = 0), then M1 ’s situation is as in Section 4.1,
with the outside market offering M2 candidates. The optimal â1 (â2 = 1) ∈ (0, 1) as well. Moreover,
for all other values of â2 , â1 (â2 ) is continuous.
Next, consider the best response of M2 to â1 . When â1 = 0, M2 is de facto a monopolist, and
the optimal â2 (â1 = 0) ∈ (0, 1). And for â1 → 1, â2 (â1 → 1) → 1 (because â1 < â2 (â1 ) < 1). And
since â1 (â2 → 1) < 1, and both curves are continuous, they must intersect at least once for interior
values of a∗i (see the Figure B.1). Hence an equilibrium exists. And since â1 < â2 (â1 ) < 1, the
inequality â1 < â2 holds in this equilibrium.

2

Note that ∂ EU∂(ââ2 |M2 ) 6= 0, because â1 affects P r(rej|M2 , a ∈ (â1 , â2 )), and the platform is aware of it when
1
calculating its best response.
32
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a2

a∗2 (a∗1 )

a∗1 (a∗2 )
a1

Figure B.1: We don’t know the exact shape of the best response curves. But by the characteristics
of the “endpoints”, and the fact that both best response curves are continuous (from the first order
conditions of platforms’ profit maximization problems), they must intersect. And since â2 (â1 ) > â1 ,
it assures the properties of the equilibrium.
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Calvó-Armengol, A. and Y. Zenou (2005). Job matching, social network and word-of-mouth communication. Journal of Urban Economics 57 (3), 500–522.
Casadesus-Masanell, R. and P. Ghemawat (2006). Dynamic mixed duopoly: A model motivated
by linux vs. windows. Management Science 52 (7), 1072–1084.
Casadesus-Masanell, R. and A. Hervas-Drane (2010). Peer-to-peer file sharing and the market for
digital information goods. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy 19 (2), 333–373.
Casadesus-Masanell, R. and F. Zhu (2010). Strategies to fight ad-sponsored rivals. Management
Science 56 (9), 1484–1499.
Damiano, E. and H. Li (2007). Price discrimination and efficient matching. Economic Theory 30 (2),
243–263.
Damiano, E. and H. Li (2008). Competing matchmaking. Journal of the European Economic
Association 6 (4), 97–126.
Eastwick, P. W., A. H. Eagly, E. J. Finkel, and S. E. Johnson (2011). Implicit and explicit
preferences for physical attractiveness in a romantic partner: a double dissociation in predictive
validity. Journal of personality and social psychology 101 (5), 993.
Economides, N. and E. Katsamakas (2006). Two-sided competition of proprietary vs. open source
technology platforms and the implications for the software industry. Management Science 52 (7),
1057–1071.
Ellison, G. and D. Fudenberg (2003). Knife-edge or plateau: When do market models tip? Quarterly
Journal of Economics 118 (4), 1249–1278.

43

Ellison, G., D. Fudenberg, and M. Mobius (2004). Competing auctions. Journal of the European
Economic Association 2 (1), 30–66.
Figueredo, A. J., J. A. Sefcek, and D. N. Jones (2006). The ideal romantic partner personality.
Personality and Individual Differences 41 (3), 431–441.
Gomes, R. and A. Pavan (2015). Matching plans for agents with vertically and horizontally differentiated preferences. Northwestern University working paper .
Hagiu, A. (2014). Strategic decisions for multisided platforms. MIT Sloan Management Review 55 (2), 71–80.
Hendel, I., A. Nevo, and F. Ortalo-Magné (2009). The relative performance of real estate marketing
platforms: MLS versus FSBOMadison.com. American Economic Review 99 (5), 1878–1898.
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